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THE “INTERIOR” REVENUE SERVICE:  
THE TAX CODE AS A VEHICLE FOR  
THIRD-PARTY ENFORCEMENT OF 
CONSERVATION EASEMENTS 
Douglas M. Humphrey* 
Abstract: Conservation easements are increasingly popular. They protect 
undeveloped land by removing the development right from the land-
owner’s “bundle of sticks” and giving it to the party holding the easement. 
These easements confer a public benefit by protecting undeveloped land, 
dedicating it to use as a park, or preserving its ecosystem services. The In-
ternal Revenue Code (the Tax Code) recognizes the public benefit, offer-
ing tax incentives for their donation to qualified organizations. However, 
the public does not have a vehicle to enforce the easements’ terms. Stand-
ing to enforce an easement is generally limited to the parties to the ease-
ment and, in some instances, the state attorneys general. This Note pro-
poses a vehicle for collateral enforcement through the Tax Code. It 
proposes a citizen suit against the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for 
approving income tax deductions for conservation easements as a way to 
ensure an easement is beneficial to the public. 
Introduction 
 Conservation easements have become very popular land preserva-
tion tools, particularly among the land trust community.1 As of 2005, 
there were over 1667 private land trusts operating in the United States 
collectively holding conservation easements that preserve over 6.2 mil-
lion acres.2 The use of conservation easements has grown over the past 
                                                                                                                      
* Editor in Chief, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2009–
2010. 
1 Jesse Dukeminier et al., Property 739 (6th ed. 2006); Daniel C. Stockford, Property 
Tax Assessment of Conservation Easements, 17 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 823, 823 (1990). A 
land trust is a nonprofit organization that actively works to conserve land by owning par-
cels outright or through conservation easements. See Dominic P. Parker, Land Trusts and the 
Choice to Conserve Land With Full Ownership or Conservation Easements, 44 Nat. Resources J. 
483, 484 (2004). 
2 Rob Aldrich & James Wyerman, Land Trust Alliance, 2005 National Land 
Trust Census Report 3, 5 (2005), http://www.landtrustalliance.org/about-us/land-trust-
census/2005-report.pdf/view [hereinafter 2005 Land Trust Report]. 
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fifteen years, with steady increases in the annual rate of conservation.3 
Between 1995 and 1998, land trusts encumbered an average of 165,000 
acres annually through conservation easements.4 The average rose to 
600,000 acres annually for 1999 and 2000.5 In 2001, 2002, and 2003, 
land trusts and similar organizations received or bought easements en-
cumbering an average of 825,000 acres per year.6 Between 2000 and 
2005, land trusts preserved 3.7 million acres, representing a 148% in-
crease in the total acreage encumbered over the five-year period.7 
 Beginning with a revenue ruling in 1964, the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) recognized charitable deductions for conservation con-
tributions.8 The plain language of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 seemed 
to prohibit any deduction for contributions of partial interest;9 how-
ever, Congress intended “that a gift of an open space easement in gross 
is to be considered a gift of an undivided interest in property where the 
easement is in perpetuity.”10 Congress clarified the requirements for a 
deduction through a series of amendments between 1976 and 1980.11 
For gifts made between 2006 and 2009, an easement donor may deduct 
the value of the easement up to fifty percent of her adjusted gross in-
come for the current taxable year and for each of the next fifteen years 
or until the deductions exhaust the easement’s value.12 Congress al-
lowed these enhanced incentives to lapse.13 Currently, the donation of 
                                                                                                                      
3 Nancy A. McLaughlin, Rethinking the Perpetual Nature of Conservation Easements, 29 
Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 421, 423 (2005). 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 See 2005 Land Trust Report, supra note 2, at 8 fig.2. Easements significantly out-
number other conservation tools. Id. In 2005, land trusts owned only 1.7 million acres, but 
they held conservation easements encumbering 6.2 million acres. Id. 
8 Rev. Rul. 64-205, 1964-2 C.B. 62. 
9 Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 201(f), 83 Stat. 487, 556. (codified as 
amended at 26 U.S.C. § 170(f) (2006)); Nancy A. McLaughlin, Increasing the Tax Incentives 
for Conservation Easement Donations—A Responsible Approach, 31 Ecology L.Q. 1, 11 (2004). 
10 H.R. Rep. No. 91-782 tit. II, subtit. A, pt.5 (1969) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1969 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2392, 2408–09. 
11 Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2124(e), 90 Stat. 1520, 1919–20 (co-
dified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 170 (2006)); Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-30, § 309, 91 Stat. 126, 154 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 170 
(2006)); Tax Treatment Extension Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-541, § 6(b), 94 Stat. 3204, 
3206–07 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 170(h) (2006)). 
12 26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(1)(E) (2006); see infra Part II.B. 
13 See § 170(b)(1)(E)(vi) (noting that the provision terminated on January 1, 2010). 
Congress is likely to extend the incentives, retroactive to January 1, 2010. See Maryland 
Environmental Trust, Tax Benefits of Donating a Conservation Easement, http://www.dnr. 
state.md.us/met/taxbenefits.html (last visited May 13, 2010). In fact, legislation is pending 
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a conservation easement qualifies for an income tax deduction up to 
thirty percent of the value of a donor’s adjusted gross income.14 The 
donor can carry forward the value of the easement donation for each 
of the next five years or until the deductions exhaust the value of the 
easement.15 
 Given the public investment in foregone revenue and the environ-
mental benefit at stake in land conservation, many commentators have 
made arguments supporting third-party standing to enforce conserva-
tion easements.16 This Note takes an alternative approach that focuses 
on the income tax deductions available under § 170(h) of the United 
States Internal Revenue Code.17 This Note argues that an aggrieved 
third party can enforce a conservation easement collaterally by suing the 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner) under 5 U.S.C. 
§§ 702 and 704 for unlawfully approving an income tax deduction un-
der 26 U.S.C. § 170(h).18 The plaintiff would bring suit for an order re-
quiring the Commissioner to find a deficiency in the taxpayer’s income 
tax return.19 Tax incentives for conservation contributions are major 
factors for many property owners;20 challenging the owners’ income tax 
deductions can provide a way to ensure that conservation easements 
further legitimate conservation purposes that provide substantial public 
benefits.21 
I. Conservation Easements and Third Party Standing 
A. Conservation Easements 
 A conservation easement is an interest in real property that im-
poses “limitations or affirmative obligations the purposes of which in-
clude retaining or protecting natural, scenic, or open-space values of 
real property, assuring its availability for agricultural, forest, recrea-
                                                                                                                      
in both the House and the Senate. See Conservation Easement Incentive Act  of 2009, H.R. 
1831 111th Cong. § 2(a)(1) (2009); Rural Heritage Conservation Extension Act of 2009, S. 
812, 111th Cong. § 2(a)(1) (2009). 
14 26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(1)(B)(i). 
15 Id. § 170(b)(1)(B)(ii). 
16 See infra Part I.B. 
17 See infra Part II. 
18 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704 (2006); 26 U.S.C. § 170(f)(3)(A), (h). Estate and gift taxes are 
beyond the scope of this Note. 
19 See infra Parts II, IV. 
20 See Julia D. Mahoney, Perpetual Restrictions on Land and the Problem of the Future, 88 Va. 
L. Rev. 739, 751 & n.48 (2002). 
21 See infra Parts II, IV. 
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tional, or open-space use, protecting natural resources, maintaining or 
enhancing air or water quality.”22 It is a “recorded deed restriction un-
der which [the owner] give[s] up some or all of the development rights 
associated with [her] property.”23 The land owner reserves the right to 
occupy and use her land; however, she and her successors in interest 
cannot engage in activities that are destructive or otherwise inconsis-
tent with preserving the land’s conservation values.24 
 The parties to the easement should view its terms as permanent 
and unchangeable; however, amendments are inevitable.25 Amend-
ments are likely to impact property value; therefore, they also have tax 
consequences for the donor, including the possibility of penalties un-
der § 6662 of the tax code.26 Generally, the easement holder should not 
permit an amendment that increases the net value of the property.27 
 Conservation easements are usually negative servitudes held in 
gross.28 Traditionally, courts were reluctant to enforce such easements 
because of concerns over the accuracy of recordation systems and re-
                                                                                                                      
22 Unif. Conservation Easement Act § 1(1), 12 U.L.A. 174 (2008). 
23 Stephen J. Small, Preserving Family Lands: Book II 23 (1997); see Julie Ann Gus-
tanski, Protecting the Land: Conservation Easements, Voluntary Actions, and Private Lands, in 
Protecting the Land: Conservation Easements Past, Present, and Future 9, 9 ( Ju-
lie Ann Gustanski & Roderick H. Squires eds., 2000). Recipients do not record all conser-
vation easements, and it can be difficult to find a recorded easement in the record system. 
See Jessica Owley Lippmann, Exacted Conservation Easements: The Hard Case of Endangered 
Species Protection, 19 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 293, 304 n.48 (2004). 
24 See Federico Cheever, Public Good and Private Magic in the Law of Land Trusts and Con-
servation Easements: A Happy Present and a Troubled Future, 73 Denv. U. L. Rev. 1077, 1079–80 
(1996); Ross D. Netherton, Environmental Conservation and Historic Preservation Through 
Recorded Land-Use Agreements, 14 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 540, 546 (1979). Conservation 
values are generally understood to include natural and open-space resources for recrea-
tional or agricultural use, air and water quality, and any historical aspects of the property; 
uses consistent with conservation values typically include farming, hunting, and sustain-
able logging. Unif. Conservation Easement Act § 1 cmt., 12 U.L.A. 175 (2008); see 
Cheever, supra, at 1079–80. 
25 Elizabeth Byers & Karin Marchetti Ponte, The Conservation Easement 
Handbook 183–84 (2nd ed. 2005). 
26 26 U.S.C. § 6662 (2006); see, e.g., Strasburg v. Comm’r, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1697, 1704–
05 (2000); Byers & Ponte, supra note 25, at 188. 
27 Byers & Ponte, supra note 25, at 188. 
28 Kenton W. Hambrick, Charitable Donations of Conservation Easements: Valuation, En-
forcement and Public Benefit, 59 Taxes 347, 348 (1981). In gross means the easement is per-
sonal to the holder and not dependent on the holder’s possession of a neighboring, ap-
purtenant parcel. See Cheever, supra note 24, at 1081; Nancy A. McLaughlin, Condemning 
Conservation Easements: Protecting the Public Interest and Investment in Conservation, 41 U.C. 
Davis L. Rev. 1897, 1900 n.3 (2008). Some transactions include the donation of a small 
piece of land neighboring the burdened land so the donated easement is appurtenant. 
McLaughlin, supra, at 1901–02. 
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straints on free alienability of the land.29 Animating both concerns was 
the fear that servitudes may restrict marketability of title, preventing the 
sale of land that would dedicate the parcel to its most economically effi-
cient or profitable use.30 Trends in federal law encouraged urban and 
suburban expansion.31 Consequently, rural areas surrounding major 
urban centers transitioned from rural, agricultural uses to suburban de-
velopments.32 As American society began to reject full development,33 
state and local governments experimented with conservation servitudes 
to supplement zoning ordinances and preserve open spaces.34 
 Realizing the need for increased conservation, all fifty states and 
the District of Columbia have enacted enabling statutes that “remove[] 
the potential common law impediments” to conservation easements.35 
Rhode Island, wanting to protect its unique history and landscape with-
out great expense to itself, “grant[ed] a special legal status to conserva-
tion restrictions” in order to ensure their “legal effect and enforceabil-
ity.”36 The enabling statute for the District of Columbia provides that a 
conservation easement is valid even though it “is not of a character that 
has been recognized traditionally at common law.”37 Georgia’s enabling 
statute, which is also modeled on the Uniform Conservation Easement 
Act (UCEA), contains similar language incubating conservation ease-
ments from any common law infirmities.38 
                                                                                                                      
29 See Janet L. Madden, Tax Incentives for Land Conservation: The Charitable Contribution 
Deduction for Gifts of Conservation Easements, 11 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 105, 121–22 (1983). 
30 See Gerald Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A Policy Analysis in the Con-
text of in Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 433, 455 (1984); John A. Swain, 
The Taxation of Private Interests in Public Property: Toward a Unified Theory of Property Taxation, 
2000 Utah L. Rev. 421, 465–66. The most economically efficient use for rural properties 
on the urban fringe usually is subdivision and development for residential or commercial 
use. Swain, supra, at 465. 
31 See Chad D. Emerson, All Sprawled Out: How the Federal Regulatory System Has Driven 
Unsustainable Growth, 75 Tenn. L. Rev. 411 passim (2008) (connecting various federal poli-
cies with sprawl); Robert H. Freilich & Bruce G. Peshoff, The Social Costs of Sprawl, 29 Urb. 
Law. 183, 186–89 (1997) (discussing how varying governmental policies contributed to 
sprawl). 
32 See, e.g., Gwenann Seznec, Note, Effective Policies for Land Preservation: Zoning and Con-
servation Easements in Anne Arundel County, Maryland, 23 Va. Envtl. L.J. 479, 480–81 (2005). 
33 Korngold, supra note 30, at 455–56. 
34 See Seznec, supra note 32, at 480–81. 
35 McLaughlin, supra note 28, at 1900 & n.5 (listing all of the state enabling statutes). 
36 R.I. Gen. Laws § 34-39-1 (1995). 
37 D.C. Code § 42-202(e)(3) (2001). 
38 Ga. Code Ann. § 44-10-5 (2002); see Unif. Conservation Easement Act § 4, 12 
U.L.A. 187 (2008). 
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B. Enforcing Conservation Easements 
 As with any lawsuit filed in federal court, a plaintiff enforcing an 
easement must have standing.39 Standing is a doctrine of justiciability 
rooted in the Case or Controversy Clause in Article III of the United 
States Constitution.40 Standing requires the plaintiff to show that she 
has suffered a legally cognizable injury that was both caused by the de-
fendant’s conduct and can be redressed by judicial decree.41 
1. Parties to the Easement 
 On the model created by the UCEA, there are four parties who 
have standing to bring a lawsuit concerning the terms or existence of a 
conservation easement.42 The first two are the owner of the burdened 
parcel and the easement holder.43 Should the owner engage in activity 
that undermines the land’s conservation values, the easement holder 
may file suit to enjoin or otherwise restrain the owner’s inconsistent 
use.44 An organization holding conservation easements is required by 
Treasury Regulations to show a willingness to enforce its easements, 
and best practices counsel organizations to have enforcement plans in 
place.45 
 Easement holders may be reluctant to initiate formal legal action 
for fear that the resulting controversy may alienate the private landown-
ers and the communities with whom they work.46 Anticipating a lack of 
will or resources, some easements include a clause conferring a right of 
enforcement on a third party.47 The UCEA provides that a third-party 
enforcement right may only be granted to a governmental body or 
                                                                                                                      
39 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975); Ari N. Sommer, Note, Taking the Pit Bull 
Off the Leash: Siccing the Endangered Species Act on Climate Change, 36 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 
273, 291 (2009). 
40 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; Warth, 422 U.S. at 498. 
41 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992); Sommer, supra note 
39, at 293–95; see infra Part III.B.1. 
42 Unif. Conservation Easement Act § 3, 12 U.L.A. 184 (2008). 
43 Id. § 3(a)(1)–(2). The owner can sue to enforce a change to the terms and condi-
tions, extinguish the easement, or, should the easement impose positive obligations on the 
holder, to compel their performance. Id. § 3, cmt. The other two parties are the third par-
ties as stated in the easement and any “person authorized by other law.” Id. § 3(a)(3)–(4). 
44 Hambrick, supra note 28, at 354. 
45 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(c) (2009); Byers & Ponte, supra note 25, at 159–60. 
46 Federico Cheever & Nancy A. McLaughlin, Why Environmental Lawyers Should Know 
(and Care) About Land Trusts and Their Private Land Conservation Transactions, 34 Envtl. L. 
Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,223, 10,223 (2004). 
47 See Byers & Ponte, supra note 25, at 172 (noting that the easement instrument 
should clearly spell out the third party’s rights in relation to the easement holder). 
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charitable organization that qualifies to hold the easement in the first 
instance; it may not be given to individuals.48 Including a provision pro-
viding for third-party enforcement may require express authorization in 
the state enabling statute. However, the practice is common and there 
are cases where the court allowed third-party enforcement absent ex-
press authorization in the state’s enabling statute.49 Furthermore, state 
enabling statutes may also include provisions granting standing to 
neighbors,50 or courts may interpret them broadly to confer standing on 
beneficiaries or state citizens.51 
2. State Attorneys General 
 The absence of third-party enforcement provisions in the ease-
ment instrument does not foreclose third-party standing.52 The state 
attorneys general may have standing under the charitable trust or pub-
lic trust doctrines.53 For a trust to exist, a grantor must pass legal title in 
property to a trustee who has a fiduciary duty to manage the trust res for 
the benefit of designated persons or an ascertainable class of persons.54 
Unlike a private, benevolent trust, which requires an ascertainable class 
of beneficiaries, a grantor with charitable intent may settle a trust for a 
recognized charitable purpose without designating specific beneficiar-
ies.55 Should the trustee breach his duty, the state attorney general can 
                                                                                                                      
48 Unif. Conservation Easement Act § 1(3) & cmt., 12 U.L.A. 175 (2008). 
49 Jessica E. Jay, Third-Party Enforcement of Conservation Easements, 29 Vt. L. Rev. 757, 
766–69 (2005); Todd D. Mayo, A Holistic Examination of the Law of Conservation Easements, in 
Protecting the Land: Conservation Easements Past, Present, and Future, supra 
note 23, at 26, 48–50. 
50 See, e.g., 765 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 120/4(c) (West 2001). 
51 Tenn. Envtl. Council, Inc. v. Bright Par 3 Assocs., L.P., No. E2003-01982-COA-R3-CV, 
2004 WL 419720, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2004) (interpreting Tennessee’s enabling 
statute as granting standing to all citizens of Tennessee); Restatement (Third) of Prop.: 
Servitudes § 8.1 (2000) (granting enforcement rights to easement beneficiaries). Tennes-
see subsequently amended its enabling statute, eliminating beneficiary standing for ease-
ments granted after July 1, 2005. Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-9-307(a)–(b) (Supp. 2007). 
52 See Sean P. Ociepka, Note, Protecting the Public Benefit: Crafting Precedent for Citizen En-
forcement of Conservation Easements, 58 Me. L. Rev. 225, 238–39 (2006). 
53 Jay, supra note 49, at 775; Alexander R. Arpad, Note, Private Transactions, Public Bene-
fits, and Perpetual Control over the Use of Real Property: Interpreting Conservation Easements as 
Charitable Trusts, 37 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 91, 143 (2002). Some state enabling statutes 
expressly provide for enforcement by the attorney general. See, e.g., Miss. Code Ann. § 89-
19-7(1)(d) (Supp. 2008). 
54 See Arpad, supra note 53, at 128. 
55 Id. at 130; Susan N. Gary, Regulating the Management of Charities: Trust Law, Corporate 
Law, and Tax Law, 21 U. Haw. L. Rev. 593, 618 (1999); see Restatement (Third) Trusts 
§ 28 & cmt. a (2003) (providing incomplete enumeration of charitable purposes, includ-
ing poverty relief, promoting education, advancing religion, promoting health, supporting 
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enforce the charitable trust on the community’s behalf.56 Absent ex-
press statutory authorization, the attorney general may argue that en-
forcement of an easement’s terms is clearly in the public interest and 
consistent with public trust principles.57 The attorney general would 
have to argue that the conservation easement can be “characterized as 
held in trust for the public’s benefit,” and the facts and circumstances, 
such as the grantor’s intent, support the attorney general’s argument.58 
If the attorney general could convince the court that a conservation 
easement is held in trust for the public, the court could enforce its 
terms in equity.59 
 State attorneys general may also base standing to enforce conserva-
tion easements on the public trust doctrine.60 The public trust doctrine 
provides that the state holds in trust for its citizens their inalienable 
rights to access and use the air, running water, sea, and sea shores.61 
Joseph Sax’s seminal article62 served as a “call to arms” for environmen-
talists to use the public trust doctrine as a vehicle for improved envi-
ronmental protection through the courts.63 Though it has been the 
subject of scholarly discussion, the public trust doctrine may not be a 
good candidate for third-party standing to enforce conservation ease-
ments.64 The concern for free “public access underlying the public trust 
doctrine is [a] different” goal than “preserving natural ecological func-
tions,” which may require denying free public access and use of natural 
resources.65 Furthermore, the land subject to the easement would have 
to be classified as land held in public trust.66 Under New Hampshire 
                                                                                                                      
governmental purposes, or promoting other purposes that are beneficial to the commu-
nity); see also Unif. Trust Code § 405(a), 7C U.L.A. 485 (2006) (providing a list that mir-
rors the Restatement). 
56 Restatement (Third) Trusts § 28 cmt. c (2003). 
57 Jay, supra note 49, at 778. 
58 Id. 
59 Jeffrey M. Tapick, Note, Threats to the Continued Existence of Conservation Easements, 27 
Colum. J. Envtl. L. 257, 289 (2002). 
60 Jay, supra note 49, at 778. 
61 George P. Smith II & Michael W. Sweeney, The Public Trust Doctrine and Natural Law: 
Emanations Within a Penumbra, 33 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 307, 308 (2006); Patrick J. Con-
nolly, Note, Saving Fish to Save the Bay: Public Trust Doctrine Protection for Menhaden’s Founda-
tional Ecosystem Services in the Chesapeake Bay, 36 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 135, 147–50 (2009). 
62 Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Inter-
vention, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 471 (1970). 
63 Smith & Sweeney, supra note 61, at 308. 
64 Jay, supra note 49, 779–81. 
65 Alison Rieser, Ecological Preservation as a Public Property Right: An Emerging Doctrine in 
Search of a Theory, 15 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 393, 410 (1991). 
66 Jay, supra note 49, at 780–81. 
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state law, “conservation easements purchased through [a land protec-
tion grant] are declared to be held in public trust by the state.”67 The 
Illinois Supreme Court has also expressed a willingness to confer stand-
ing broadly on the basis of the public trust doctrine.68 Jessica Jay argues 
that these situations are rare, and when land subject to a conservation 
easement is held in public trust, attorney general standing would flow 
from the land’s status as held in public trust instead of the conservation 
easement’s public benefit.69 
3. Neighbors and Private Citizens 
 Two state enabling statutes provide standing for neighbors or other 
private citizens. Illinois has a generous provision for neighbor standing 
in its enabling statute, giving standing to any neighbor owning land 
within 500 feet of an easement-burdened parcel.70 In Tennessee, any 
citizen of the state, acting as a beneficiary, can enforce the terms of an 
easement transferred prior to July 1, 2005.71 
 Furthermore, if the neighbor has a special interest in the en-
forcement of a conservation easement that is arguably held in trust, she 
may have standing to sue to enforce its terms.72 Depending on state 
law, the neighbor or public citizen may have standing under charitable 
trust theory if the trust provides that the individual benefits under its 
terms in a way that is distinct from the general public.73 Because of the 
steps of interpretation required to construe the easement as property 
held in public trust, standing under this theory is hard to envision.74 
The public trust doctrine may also confer standing on private citizens 
by showing that they “are constituents or taxpayers of a public trust that 
includes the easement-encumbered property.”75 
 Carol Necole Brown argues that “private parties should have a 
common law property interest in conservation easements sufficient to 
                                                                                                                      
67 Id. at 781; see N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 486-A:13 (2001). 
68 See Paepcke v. Pub. Bldg. Comm’n, 263 N.E.2d 11, 18 (Ill. 1970) (holding that to tell 
taxpayers that they have to rely solely on state action would deny their rights under the 
public trust doctrine for all time). 
69 Jay, supra note 49, at 781. 
70 765 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 120/4(c) (West 2001). 
71 Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-9-307(b) (Supp. 2007). 
72 Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 391 & cmt. c (1959). 
73 Id. cmt. c. 
74 Jay, supra note 49, at 776–77. 
75 Id. at 786. 
434 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 37:425 
confer standing to seek injunctive relief.”76 Brown’s argument draws on 
scholarship that seeks to reconstitute the proverbial bundle of sticks by 
making the metaphor more representative of the social and communal 
dimensions of property.77 Brown’s theory generates a new stick—a 
common law interest in all conservation easements—that is held by pri-
vate citizens.78 By having a legally recognized interest in the easement, 
private citizens would have standing to enforce its terms.79 Brown ar-
gues that a common law property interest in conservation easements is 
an efficient mechanism for enforcement that respects both the conser-
vation easement’s status as a private transaction as well as its public 
benefit.80 The common law interest in the conservation easement is 
also democratic in so far as it disperses decision-making about privately 
owned land that is protected for public benefit beyond the parties to 
the easement.81 
 Another basis for citizen enforcement for conservation easements 
emerges from citizen-suit theory,82 which is common in environmental 
law.83 Sean P. Ociepka argues that citizen-suit provisions may provide a 
model for third-party enforcement.84 Congress anticipated that federal 
agencies might lack the resources or political will to enforce the laws.85 
Anticipating weak enforcement, Congress included in many of the ma-
jor environmental statutes citizen-suit provisions that permit citizens to 
bring lawsuits to enforce the provisions of the act.86 Citizen suits “would 
motivate governmental agencies to act on their nondiscretionary du-
ties” under environmental statutes.87 In light of the public benefit at 
                                                                                                                      
76 Carol Necole Brown, A Time to Preserve: A Call for Formal Private-Party Rights in Perpet-
ual Conservation Easements, 40 Ga. L. Rev. 85, 88 (2005). 
77 See, e.g., Craig Anthony Arnold, The Reconstitution of Property: Property as a Web of Inter-
ests, 26 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 281 (2002); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Prop-
erty and Antiproperty, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (2003); Robert J. Goldstein, Green Wood in the 
Bundle of Sticks: Fitting Environmental Ethics and Ecology into Real Property Law, 25 B.C. Envtl. 
Aff. L. Rev. 347 (1998). 
78 Brown, supra note 76, at 107–08. 
79 Id. at 108–09. 
80 See id. at 127. 
81 See id. at 112, 132. 
82 Jay, supra note 49, at 786–87. 
83 See Zygmunt J.B. Plater et al., Environmental Law and Policy: Nature, Law, 
and Society 1027–28 (3rd ed. 2004) (discussing citizen suits as compliments to govern-
mental enforcement efforts). 
84 Ociepka, supra note 52, 245–48. 
85 Matthew Burrows, Note, The Clean Air Act: Citizen Suits, Attorneys’ Fees, and the Separate 
Public Interest Requirement, 36 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 103, 109–10 (2009). 
86 Plater et al., supra note 83, at 407 & n.38. 
87 Burrows, supra note 85, at 110. 
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stake, citizen enforcement of conservation easements would serve a 
similar purpose; should the easement holder fail to enforce the ease-
ment, a public citizen could do so.88 
II. Conservation Easements and the Internal Revenue Code: 
Income Tax Deductions for Qualified Conservation 
Contributions Under 26 U.S.C. § 170(h) 
 The Treasury “Secretary is authorized and required to make the 
inquiries, determinations, and assessments of all taxes . . . imposed” by 
the Code or any other internal revenue law.89 Each taxpayer is required 
to submit a return to allow the determination and assessment of the 
taxpayer’s liability.90 “If the Secretary determines that there is a defi-
ciency” in the taxpayer’s reported liability with respect to income taxes, 
he must issue to the taxpayer a notice of deficiency before assessing the 
taxes.91 The taxpayer may file a petition for review with the Tax Court 
to challenge the deficiency finding; the failure to timely file a petition 
results in the assessment of the deficiency.92 If the taxpayer fails to pay 
her taxes after notice and demand, “the amount shall be a lien in favor 
of the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether 
real or personal, belonging to that person.”93 
A. The Shape of the Incentive: Allowed Deductions and Their Value 
 Income tax deductions are taken against the taxpayer’s contribu-
tion base, defined as the taxpayer’s “adjusted gross income” calculated 
“without regard to any net operating loss carryback.”94 Gross income 
includes “income from whatever source derived.”95 “The applicable 
percentage of the contribution base varies depending on the type of 
donee organization and property contributed.”96 Prior to 2010, conser-
                                                                                                                      
88 See Jay, supra note 49, at 786–87. 
89 26 U.S.C. § 6201(a) (2006). 
90 Id. §§ 6201(a)(1), 6203. 
91 Id. § 6212(a); see Laing v. United States, 423 U.S. 161, 173 n.18 (1976) (defining de-
ficiency as “the amount of tax imposed less any amount that may have been reported by 
the taxpayer on his return”). 
92 26 U.S.C. § 6213(a), (c). 
93 Stephen C. Loadholt Trust v. Comm’r, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 675, 677 (2000). Section 
6323 generally requires the Commissioner to file a notice of federal tax lien with the ap-
propriate state office or the local federal district court. 26 U.S.C § 6323(f). 
94 26 U.S.C. § 170(a)(1), (b)(1)(G). 
95 Id. § 61(a). 
96 Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 109th Cong., Technical Explanation of 
H.R. 4, The “Pension Protection Act of 2006,” as Passed by the House on July 28, 
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vation easements receive special treatment. Unlike other capital assets, 
a taxpayer may deduct the value of a contributed conservation ease-
ment up to fifty percent of her contribution base.97 She can carry over 
the remaining balance for annual deductions over the next fifteen 
years or until she exhausts the easement’s value.98 Qualified conserva-
tion contributions are not taken into account in determining the 
amount of other allowable charitable contributions.99 After the lapse of 
these special provisions, conservation easements are subject to the gen-
eral provisions provided in § 170(b).100 The donor may deduct thirty 
percent of the value of the contribution from the taxable income in the 
year that it is donated and for each of the next five years or until the 
value of the gift is exhausted by the donations.101 
 The value of a real property interest contribution is the fair market 
value of the property at the time of contribution.102 For qualified con-
servation contributions, it is the fair market value of the perpetual re-
striction at the time of the donation.103 To determine its value, the 
easement may be compared with similar transactions for similar par-
cels.104 If no such market exists, valuation may be determined based on 
the difference between the fair market value of the parcel without the 
easement and its fair market value after it is burdened by the ease-
ment.105 If a taxpayer uses this “before and after” method, she needs to 
include in the valuation the likelihood that the property would be de-
veloped absent the easement as well as the potential impact that zon-
                                                                                                                      
2006, and as Considered by the Senate on August 3, 2006, at 275 ( JCX-38-06) (Aug. 3, 
2006), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/x-38-06.pdf. 
97 26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(1)(E)(i). 
98 Id. § 170(b)(1)(E)(ii). 
99 Id. § 170(b)(1)(E)(iii). 
100 Id. § 170(b)(1)(B). 
101 Id. 
102 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(1) (2009). 
103 Id. § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(i). 
104 Id. 
105 Id. Congress adopted this method of valuation because of the paucity of market 
mechanisms—understood as the price at which the real property interest would change 
hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller—for conservation easements and other, 
similar restrictions. See S. Rep. No. 96-1007, at 14–15 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6736, 6749–50. The Senate Finance Committee noted that the increase in the number of 
purchase programs may allow for a market mechanism based on the amount paid for 
easements. See id. at 14–15. The committee also anticipated that valuation would increas-
ingly take into account the selling price for properties burdened with comparable restric-
tions where the sale was an arm’s length transaction. Id. at 15. 
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ing, conservation, or historic preservation laws may have on the value 
of the burdened parcel.106 
 For both the fair market value and before and after valuation me-
thods, the Code prohibits the donor from taking a deduction where the 
donor anticipates financial or economic benefits that exceed the bene-
fits for the general public.107 The Code also prohibits the donor from 
taking a deduction where the property value is only marginally im-
pacted or is actually increased by the easement.108 However, a deduc-
tion will not be denied if the donor receives some incidental benefit as 
a result of the conservation restrictions.109 
B. The Incentives at Work: The Intersection of Financial  
and Conservation Values 
 The allure of the income tax incentives provided in § 170(h) to po-
tential conservation easement donors depends on the financial status of 
the landowner.110 Two categories of donors are particularly common in 
the scholarship: the land-rich, cash-rich landowner and the land-rich, 
cash-poor landowner.111 Land-rich, cash-rich landowners draw large in-
comes that also come with steep income tax liabilities.112 They are “the 
most appropriate targets of the federal tax incentives” because charita-
ble income tax deductions are most attractive to high-income earners 
with large tax liabilities.113 
 Land-rich, cash poor landowners possess property that has valuable 
development potential.114 However, if they donate an easement, they 
                                                                                                                      
106 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(ii). The IRS adopted this form of valuation because 
“there is usually no substantial record of market place sales to use as a meaningful or valid 
comparison.” Rev. Rul. 73-339, 1973-2 C.B. 68. 
107 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(i). 
108 Id. § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(ii). 
109 Id. § 1.170A-14(e)(1). 
110 See McLaughlin, supra note 9, at 47–48. 
111 See, e.g., Jessica E. Jay, Land Trust Risk Management of Legal Defense and Enforcement of 
Conservation Easements: Potential Solutions, 6 Envtl. Law. 441, 455–56 (2000); Seznec, supra 
note 32, at 517. 
112 See Jay, supra note 111, at 456. In most cases, the tax incentives are not lucrative 
enough to recover the transaction costs and lost value associated with the donation. See 
McLaughlin, supra note 9, at 49–50. 
113 McLaughlin, supra note 9, at 100. 
114 Jay, supra note 111, at 455–56. For this category of owner, which is often comprised 
of farmers or ranchers, the estate tax deductions are usually more of an incentive; by de-
creasing the property value, the owner can afford the state property taxes and her heirs 
will not need to sell the property in order to pay the estate taxes. Id.; see also Tapick, supra 
note 59, at 263 & n.12. But see Daniel H. Cole, Pollution & Property: Comparing 
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lose the development value without the opportunity to recoup it 
through income tax savings because their income tax liabilities are rela-
tively small.115 The loss is particularly acute for property owners that rely 
on their properties’ development value as a buffer against financial un-
certainty, use it as collateral, or anticipate that the proceeds from a fu-
ture sale may provide retirement income.116 Congress amended the 
Code in 2006 to increase the incentives for low-income donors.117 Even 
with the added twenty-percent deduction and the fifteen-year, carry-
forward term, low-income individuals will not be able to recover a sig-
nificant portion of the lost development value.118 For land-rich, cash-
poor owners with property near urban areas, sale and development may 
be the only viable option to realize their properties’ full economic 
value.119 
 This suggests that the tax deductions—absent other motives—do 
not create an incentive that is attractive enough to induce land conser-
vation.120 It is true that many donors report that their primary concern 
is preserving the land in a natural condition.121 However, for many 
land-rich, cash-poor landowners, easements nonetheless allow them to 
protect their livelihood.122 Valuable property has high property tax 
burdens that many cash-poor property owners simply cannot afford.123 
                                                                                                                      
Ownership Institutions for Environmental Protection 62 (2002) (noting that later 
generations may prefer to sell the property instead of conserve it). 
115 McLaughlin, supra note 9, at 29. 
116 Id. at 27–28. 
117 Federal Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 1206(a)(1), 120 
Stat. 780, 1068 (codified in 26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(1)(E) (2006)). Congress enhanced the tax 
benefits for conservation easements by increasing the deductable percentage from thirty 
percent to fifty percent of the contribution base and extended the period to carry the 
deductions forward from five years to fifteen years. Id. Ranchers and farmers who satisfy 
§ 2032A(e)(5)’s requirements and make more than fifty percent of their gross income 
from farming activities may deduct one hundred percent of their contribution base. 26 
U.S.C. §§ 170(b)(1)(E)(iv)–(v), 2032A(e)(5) (2006). Congress did not extend these provi-
sions when they terminated on December 31, 2009. See id. § 170(b)(1)(E)(vi); supra note 
13. 
118 See McLaughlin, supra note 9, at 101. 
119 See Hearing on the Impact of Tax Law on Land Use, Conservation, and Preservation Before the 
Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. 61, 82 (1999) (state-
ment of Michael Dennis, Vice President and General Counsel, The Nature Conservancy). 
120 McLaughlin, supra note 9, at 48–49. 
121 See Cole, supra note 114, at 62. 
122 Stephanie L. Sandre, Conservation Easements: Minimizing Taxes and Maximizing Land, 
4 Drake J. Agric. L. 357, 360 (1999). 
123 Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, Land Use Law and Active Living: Opportunities for 
States to Assume a Leadership Role in Promoting and Incentivizing Local Options, 5 Rutgers J. L. 
& Pub. Pol’y 317, 357 (2008). 
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Furthermore, estate taxes may be prohibitively high, forcing the owner’s 
heirs to sell the property to pay the tax bill.124 A conservation easement, 
by depressing the property’s value, relieves tax burdens, allowing the 
owner and her family to continue using the land in a way consistent 
with its conservation values.125 Some donors also find emotional satis-
faction in protecting the land; they love it so much they want it to re-
main undeveloped.126 
 However, the popularity of conservation as a tax planning tool 
suggests the tax incentives play a role in donations.127 The tax deduc-
tions remove some of the disincentives or hurdles to conservation.128 
For landowners who may be predisposed to conservation, the recovery 
of preservation costs through income tax deductions may provide the 
necessary incentive for them to protect their land.129 Conservation also 
incurs maintenance costs for tasks such as expelling trespassers or ad-
verse possessors that can be offset through income tax deductions.130 
 The incentives lure some landowners to donate easements.131 Af-
fluent landowners who do not have plans to develop their land “are 
likely to aggressively” take advantage of the income tax benefits.132 
While they may be the prime target for the easements, the incentives 
may attract donors and donations that fall outside of the scope of Con-
gress’s intentions.133 Some landowners seek to take advantage of con-
servation easement deductions by developing and subdividing the land, 
but build fewer houses than allowed under local zoning laws.134 Devel-
opers may also want to conserve “unusable acres” that are left over after 
                                                                                                                      
124 Jay, supra note 111, at 456. 
125 Id. 
126 Nancy A. McLaughlin & W. William Weeks, In Defense of Conservation Easements: A Re-
sponse to The End of Perpetuity, 9 Wyo. L. Rev. 1, 82–83 (2009). 
127 See, e.g., Andrea Coombes, Seven New Tax Perks, Wall St. J., Jan. 30, 2009, http:// 
online.wsj.com/article/SB123325993176629883.html?mod=vocus (quoting a tax strategist 
discussing how many of her clients are using the new incentives). 
128 Cole, supra note 114, at 63. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 62. 
131 Tapick, supra note 59, at 262; Coombes, supra note 127. 
132 See McLaughlin, supra note 9, at 100. 
133 See The Tax Code and Land Conservation: Report on Investigations and Proposals for Reform 
Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 109th Cong. 39 (2005) (statement of Steven T. Miller, Comm’r, 
Tax-Exempt and Governmental Entities Operating Division, Internal Revenue Service) 
[hereinafter Miller Testimony]. 
134 Stephen J. Small, Commentary, Proper—and Improper—Deductions for Conservation 
Easement Donations, Including Developer Donation, 105 Tax Notes 217, 218 (2004). 
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the property has already been subdivided and developed.135 Golf 
course developers and owners have also sought to reap the tax advan-
tages by burdening fairways or the open spaces separating the individ-
ual holes on a golf course.136 
C. Using the Incentive: Current Requirements for Income Tax Deduction  
for Qualified Conservation Contributions 
 “Generally, to be deductible as a charitable contribution under 
§ 170 [of the Code], a transfer to a charitable organization must be a 
gift of money or property without receipt or expectation of receipt of 
adequate consideration or payment commensurate with the value of 
the gift.”137 While 26 U.S.C. § 170(f)(3)(A) requires that the donation 
be the owner’s full interest in the property unless it is donated in 
trust,138 there is an exception for conservation contributions.139 A do-
nor can qualify for an income tax deduction if her donation is a quali-
fied real property interest donated to a qualified organization exclu-
sively for conservation purposes.140 
1. Qualified Real Property Interest 
 Under Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14(b)(2), a perpetual con-
servation restriction “is a restriction granted in perpetuity on the use 
which may be made of real property . . . that under state law has attrib-
utes similar to an easement.”141 The perpetuity requirement ensures 
that the easement “will prevent uses of the retained interest [that are] 
inconsistent with the conservation purposes of the donation.”142 State 
                                                                                                                      
135 See, e.g., Joe Stephens & David B. Ottaway, Developers Find Payoff in Preservation—
Donors Reap Tax Incentive by Giving to Land Trust, but Critics Fear Abuse of System, Wash. Post, 
Dec. 21, 2003, at A1 (discussing a 450-acre development in Chester County, Pennsylvania 
that included a residual conservation easement encumbering an undevelopable flood 
plain). 
136 Id. 
137 I.R.S. Notice 2004-41, 2004-28 I.R.B. 31; see Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 
690 (1989) (discussing how a gift must be given with charitable intent and not with some 
expectation of a quid pro quo arrangement). 
138 26 U.S.C. § 170(f)(3)(A) (2006). 
139 Id. § 170(f)(3)(B)(iii). 
140 Id. § 170(h)(1)(A)–(C). 
141 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(b)(2) (2009). 
142 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(1). The requirement expresses the conviction that the 
land needs to remain undeveloped for long periods of time if its conservation benefits are 
going to accrue to the public. See Mary Ann King & Sally K. Fairfax, Public Accountability 
and Conservation Easements: Learning from the Uniform Conservation Easement Act Debates, 46 
Nat. Resources J. 65, 104 (2006). 
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property law generally governs for tax purposes.143 A conservation 
easement granted pursuant to a state enabling statute is presumed to 
satisfy the qualified real property interest requirement.144 
2. Qualified Organization 
 The four categories of qualified organizations are federal or state 
government entities, tax-exempt non-profit organizations, or some sub-
sidiary of either of them over which they exercise control.145 A qualified 
organization must “have a commitment to protect the conservation 
purposes of the donation, and have the resources to enforce the restric-
tions.”146 The commitment in principle does not need to be matched 
by the commitment of funds set aside to enforce any of the organiza-
tion’s easements.147 
 By restricting the parties that can receive conservation easements, 
the tax code ensures some measure of public accountability via “self-
governing restraints.”148 Government agencies are accountable to the 
public through the democratic process.149 The checking power of de-
mocracy creates an incentive for government agencies “to accept only 
those easements that provide public benefit.”150 Recognizing that this 
check is imperfect, Congress included a requirement that the preserva-
tion be pursuant to a clearly delineated governmental conservation 
policy.151 Congress also limited the qualifying organizations to charities 
on the theory that charities are accountable to the public for their sup-
port in the form of donations or volunteer services.152 Compared to 
private foundations that are not dependent on private donations, chari-
                                                                                                                      
143 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(b)(2); see Joshua Welsh, Comment, Firm Ground for Wetland 
Protection: Using the Treaty Power to Strengthen Conservation Easements, 36 Stetson L. Rev. 207, 
228–29 (2006). 
144 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(b)(2). State marketable title acts do not disqualify conser-
vation easements that are subject to re-recordation requirements. See id. § 1.170A-14(g)(3); 
Welsh, supra note 143, at 229 (describing re-recordation requirements). 
145 26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(vi). 
146 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(c). 
147 Id. 
148 Hambrick, supra note 28, at 354; King & Fairfax, supra note 142, at 92. 
149 McLaughlin, supra note 10, at 60–61. 
150 Id. at 61. 
151 See 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(4)(A)(iii)(II) (2006). 
152 McLaughlin, supra note 9, at 61–62. In theory, a charity’s interest in maintaining a 
positive reputation and good relationship with its community operates as an indirect check 
on its activities. See King & Fairfax, supra note 142, at 92. 
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ties are more likely to both enforce the terms of their easements and to 
provide benefits to the general public.153 
3. Conservation Purpose 
 The term “conservation purpose” means: (1) “[t]he preservation of 
land areas for outdoor recreation” and education; (2) the protection of 
natural wildlife habitat, fish, plants, or ecosystems; (3) the preservation 
of open space, including farmland and forests; or (4) “the preservation 
of a historically important land area or certified historic structure.”154 A 
contribution needs to satisfy only one of the four conservation purposes 
to qualify for a deduction.155 
a. Recreation or Education 
 Donations of a qualified real property interest that preserve land 
areas for outdoor recreation and education of the general public meet 
Treasury regulations’ requirements.156 To qualify, the recreational or 
educational use by the general public must be substantial and regu-
lar.157 Because most easement donors do not want to grant access to 
their land for recreational activities, donors usually justify their dona-
tions under one or more of the other three categories.158 
b. Significant Habitat or Ecosystem 
 The donation of a qualified real property interest qualifies for a 
deduction when it protects a “significant relatively natural habitat” for 
fish, wildlife, plant community, or similar ecosystem.159 The Tax Court 
adopted a plain meaning definition of habitat as “‘[t]he area or envi-
ronment where an organism or ecological community normally lives or 
                                                                                                                      
153 McLaughlin, supra note 9 at 61–62. Congress assumes that charities have to be re-
sponsive to their communities and the general public if they are to survive. Id. 
154 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d)(1)(i)–(iv) (2008). 
155 S. Rep. No. 96-1007, at 10 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6736, 6745–46. 
156 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d)(2)(i). 
157 Id. § 1.170A-14(d)(2)(ii). 
158 Richard Brewer, Conservancy: The Land Trust Movement in America 155 
(2003); John B. Wright, Conservation Easements: An Analysis of Donated Development Rights, 59 
J. Am. Plan. Ass’n 487, 489 (1993). 
159 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d)(3)(i). Significant habitats or ecosystems include, but are 
not limited to habitats for rare or endangered species, “natural areas that represent high 
quality examples of a terrestrial community or aquatic community,” or natural areas bor-
dering national, local, or state parks that contribute to the parks’ ecological viability. Id. 
§ 1.170A-14(d)(3)(ii). In addition to parks, this provision includes “nature preserve, wild-
life refuge, wilderness area, and other similar conservation area.” Id. 
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occurs’ or ‘[t]he place where a person or thing is most likely to be 
found.’”160 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit followed the 
Tax Court in adopting the dictionary definition of habitat.161 The 
courts have also held that the size of the parcel is not a critical factor.162 
What matters is the assurance that the rights and uses retained by the 
property owner do not undermine the conservation purpose.163 Fur-
thermore, the Code does not require public access where the conserva-
tion easement protects environmental systems or natural habitat.164 
While human interaction and alteration of the environment that allow 
“fish, wildlife, or plants [to] continue to exist . . . in a relatively natural 
state” do not foreclose taking the deduction, ecosystem fragility and the 
conservation of wildlife habitat may require the complete ban on pub-
lic access.165 
c. Preservation of Open Space 
 Open space easements, allowed under § 170(h)(4)(A) are both 
the most common and the most problematic type of conservation 
easement.166 The preservation of open space, which includes farmland 
and forest land, qualifies for tax deductions when the preservation is 
for the scenic enjoyment of the general public or pursuant to a clearly 
delineated federal, state, or local governmental conservation policy.167 
It also must yield a significant public benefit.168 
i. Scenic Enjoyment 
 A contribution to preserve open space for the scenic enjoyment of 
the public qualifies where “development of the property would impair 
the scenic character of the local rural or urban landscape or would in-
terfere with a scenic panorama” enjoyed from a neighboring park or 
wilderness area.169 The determination of whether a contribution of a 
conservation easement qualifies under the scenic enjoyment conserva-
                                                                                                                      
160 Glass v. Comm’r, 124 T.C. 258, 281–82 (2005) (quoting the American Heritage 
Dictionary of the English Language 786 (4th ed. 2000)). 
161 Glass v. Comm’r, 471 F.3d 698, 708 (6th Cir. 2006). 
162 Glass, 471 F.3d at 711. 
163 See id. 
164 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d)(3)(iii). 
165 Id. § 1.170A-14(d)(3)(i), (iii). 
166 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(4)(A)(iii) (2006); see Miller Testimony, supra note 133, at 38–39. 
167 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(4)(A)(iii). 
168 Id. 
169 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d)(4)(ii). 
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tion purpose is based on a subjective test that considers “all pertinent 
facts and circumstances germane to the contribution.”170 The test 
weighs factors such as variations in “topography, geology, biology, and 
cultural and economic conditions.”171 The taxpayer has to demonstrate 
the scenic characteristics of the donation, and show that there is a sig-
nificant public benefit independent of the subjective, scenic quality of 
the land.172 
 To assist the taxpayer in demonstrating the scenic quality of the 
donation, Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-14 provides a list of eight fac-
tors.173 The requirements are largely contextual, examining the rela-
tionship and compatibility of the burdened parcel and neighboring 
parcels, the proximity of urban areas, and the degree to which the land 
use “maintains the scale and character of the urban landscape to pre-
serve open space, visual enjoyment, and sunlight for the surrounding 
area.”174 Openness is a particularly important factor for urban or 
densely populated areas where the open space can provide relief from 
urban closeness.175 Other factors are aesthetic, weighing the degree of 
contrast and variety provided by the visual scene.176 
ii. Governmental Conservation Policy 
 Conservation easement donations are deductible as preserving 
open space where they further a clearly delineated governmental policy 
embodied in a “specific, identified conservation project.”177 In these 
instances, the donation extends the protection to types of property 
public officials have already deemed worthy of preservation or conser-
vation.178 The acceptance of the easement by the governmental body 
tends to establish the requirement of a clearly delineated governmental 
policy. However, the regulations suggest that a rigorous review proc-
ess—such as site-specific resolutions by boards of supervisors or plan-
                                                                                                                      
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(4)(A)(iii); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d)(4)(ii). 
173 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d)(4)(ii). 
174 Id. § 1.170A-14(d)(4)(ii)(1), (4), (6). 
175 Id. § 1.170A-14(d)(4)(ii)(3)–(4). 
176 Id. § 1.170A-14(d)(4)(ii)(2), (5). The remaining factors examine whether the do-
nated easement is consistent with government landscape inventories. Id. § 1.170A-
14(d)(4)(ii)(7)–(8). 
177 Id. § 1.170A-14(d)(4)(iii). 
178 Id. 
2010] Third Party Enforcement of Conservation Easements via the Tax Code 445 
ning commissioners—is necessary where the donation is accepted by a 
land trust or similar organization on behalf of the government.179 
iii. Significant Public Benefit 
 All contributions made to preserve “open space must yield a sig-
nificant public benefit.”180 The determination of public benefit is con-
textual; factors germane for one contribution may be irrelevant for an-
other contribution.181 The IRS provides guidance by listing factors it 
deems relevant in evaluating the significance of the public benefit con-
ferred by the contribution.182 The list of factors includes the “unique-
ness of the property,” the intensity of land development and population 
density in the vicinity, the contribution’s consistency with government 
and private conservation activities in the area, and the degree to which 
development would degrade the area’s scenic quality.183 
d. Exclusively for Conservation Purposes 
 Section 170(h)(5)(A) reiterates the perpetuity requirement.184 A 
deduction will not be denied simply because some incidental benefit 
accrues to the donor as a result of her donation.185 The requirement 
that the donation be exclusively for conservation purposes does not 
prohibit all activities on the land; uses that will not interfere with the 
conservation purposes advanced by the easement are allowed.186 A use 
that contravenes one conservation purpose is permitted, provided the 
use furthers a different conservation purpose.187 
                                                                                                                      
179 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d)(4)(iii)(B). 
180 Id. § 1.170A-14(d)(4)(iv). 
181 Id. 
182 Id. § 1.170A-14(d)(4)(iv)(A)(1)–(11). 
183 Id. 
184 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(5)(A) (2006). 
185 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(e)(1). 
186 See id. § 1.170A-14(e)(2). Common examples are selective timber harvesting and 
non-industrial farming. See id. 
187 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(e)(3). For instance, an archeological investigation, using 
sound archeological practices, does not prevent a deduction even though it may interrupt 
or impair a scenic view. See id. 
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III. 26 U.S.C. § 170(h) as Environmental Law 
A. The Transmission of Environmental Values into the Tax Code 
 The Code is generally concerned with the federal government’s 
assessment and collection of tax revenue.188 It is widely accepted that 
Congress may use its taxing power to further national objectives that 
are not related to the assessment and collection of revenue.189 The tax 
system may be utilized for nonrevenue ends when the goal is of overrid-
ing importance to society and the tax code offers the most effective 
means for achieving the objective.190 
 Congress uses the Code as a vehicle for environmental protec-
tion.191 The tax incentives for conservation easements are simply one 
among many tax incentives geared towards environmental protection.192 
For instance, farmers who conserve water without damaging wetlands 
are entitled to deduct the associated costs from their income taxes.193 
Brownfield redevelopment is also encouraged through tax incentives 
that seek to recruit private-sector partners to assist with clean-up costs 
and economic revitalization.194 Congress also uses tax incentives to en-
courage energy efficiency and reductions in greenhouse gas emis-
sions.195 
                                                                                                                      
188 See Deborah A. Dyson, Note, Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction and the Power to Enjoin the 
IRS, 70 Minn. L. Rev. 1279, 1305 (1986). 
189 Burton S. Kliman, The Use of Conservation Restrictions on Historic Properties as Charitable 
Donations for Federal Income Tax Purposes, 9 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 513, 515 & n.11 (1981). 
190 Id. at 516. 
191 Richard A. Westin, Understanding Environmental Taxes, 46 Tax Law. 327, 327 (1992). 
192 Ian Bowles et al., Economic Incentives and Legal Tools for Private Sector Conservation, 8 
Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F. 209, 220–26 (1998); Conrad Teitell et al., Tax Incentive for Sensi-
ble Land Use Through Gifts of Conservation Easements, 15 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 1, 1–2 
(1980). 
193 26 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006) (providing special tax treatment for wetlands). 
194 See, e.g., id. § 1396 (granting to employers in “Empowerment Zones” a 20% tax 
credit for the first $15,000 of qualified wages paid to each employee who is a zone resident 
and performs most employment services within the zone); see also Scott A. Tschirgi, Aiming 
the Tax Code at Distressed Areas: An Examination and Analysis of Current Enterprise Zone Propos-
als, 43 Fla. L. Rev. 991, 1006–12 (1991). Brownfields, usually located in inner-city areas, 
are abandoned industrial sites that pose environmental risks because they contain hazard-
ous contamination. Andrea Wortzel, Greening the Inner Cities: Can Federal Tax Incentives Solve 
the Brownfields Problem?, 29 Urb. Law. 309, 310 n.6 (1997). 
195 See generally Richard A. Westin, Energy and Environmental Tax Changes in the Flood of 
Recent Federal Revenue Laws and What They Imply, 15 Penn St. Envtl. L. Rev. 171 (2007) 
(providing a detailed discussion of recent legislative action that uses the tax code to pro-
mote environmental initiatives). 
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 The IRS recognizes the intersection of environmental law and the 
Code in two respects that are particularly pertinent for this Note. First, 
the IRS has expressly connected tax deductions for land conservation 
with the national policy of preserving unique aspects of the natural en-
vironment.196 An organization that protected ecologically sensitive land 
was entitled to tax-exempt status because it enhanced the accomplish-
ments of the express national policy announced in the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act and federal conservation laws.197 Organizations 
that improved water quality and provided sanctuary to wild birds and 
animals also qualified for tax-exempt status.198 
 In addition, the IRS has also held that private litigation that en-
forces environmental statutes promotes a charitable purpose.199 In 
making this determination, the IRS based its conclusion on the con-
gressional policy that private litigation is a desirable and appropriate 
means for enforcing environmental statutes.200 Private action imple-
menting public policy is frequently desirable201 because it can vindicate 
“expressions of congressional or constitutional policy.”202 
B. The Administrative Procedure Act in the Context of the Internal  
Revenue Code and Environmental Law 
1. Environmental Accountability: Standing and Judicial Review of 
Agency Action Under the Administrative Procedures Act 
 Federal environmental laws are enforced in one of three ways: by 
federal agencies designated by Congress to do so, the citizen-suit provi-
sions commonly found in environmental protection statutes, and citi-
zens or private organizations that use the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA) to bring suit and force agencies to abide by their legal obliga-
tions and rules.203 The second and third forms are particularly com-
mon as citizens and non-profit environmental organizations have as-
sumed quasi-executive roles in enforcing environmental laws and 
                                                                                                                      
196 Rev. Rul. 76-204, 1976-1 C.B. 152. 
197 Id. 
198 Rev. Rul. 67-292, 1967-2 C.B. 184; Rev. Rul. 70-186, 1970-1 C.B. 129. 
199 Rev. Rul. 80-278, 1980-2 C.B. 175. 
200 Id. (citing citizen-suit provisions in environmental statutes). 
201 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 271 (1975). 
202 Id. at 285 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
203 Susan D. Daggett, NGOs as Lawmakers, Watchdogs, Whistle-Blowers, and Private Attorneys 
General, Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y, Winter 2002, at 99, 101. 
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regulations.204 By routinely including citizen-suit provisions in envi-
ronmental statutes, Congress envisions increased public participation 
in the environmental arena.205 Congress also grants more breadth for 
citizen suits in the environmental context than in other areas of the 
law.206 Finally, the APA provides that the aggrieved party can bring her 
action in a court specified by statute or in a court of competent jurisdic-
tion.207 The APA is frequently used for bringing suits to enforce envi-
ronmental laws and regulations.208 
 The APA allows any person suffering legal wrong or adversely af-
fected or aggrieved by agency action to seek judicial review of the 
agency action.209 Agency means “each authority of the Government of 
the United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by an-
other agency.”210 Agency action “includes the whole or a part of an 
agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial 
thereof, or failure to act.”211 Congress adopted the term agency action 
to “assure the complete coverage of every form of agency power, pro-
ceeding, action, or inaction.”212 Consequently, the term encompasses 
the findings, conclusions, or reasons for the action or inaction.213 
 The APA presumes the availability of judicial review;214 however, a 
plaintiff bringing suit under the APA must satisfy the constitutional and 
                                                                                                                      
204 See id. 
205 See Ociepka, supra note 52, at 246. 
206 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 164–65 (1997) (noting that in the context of com-
mercial matters, Congress authorizes suits only by parties injured in their business or 
property interests). 
207 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 703 (2006). In tax-related matters gener-
ally, the plaintiff has three options for venue: the Tax Court, a federal district court, or the 
United States Court of Federal Claims. See Ellen P. Aprill, Muffled Chevron: Judicial Review 
of Tax Regulations, 3 Fla. Tax Rev. 51, 61 (1996). 
208 See, e.g., Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971);see also 
Plater et al., supra note 83, at 1027–28. 
209 5 U.S.C. § 702. Person “includes an individual, partnership, corporation, associa-
tion, or public or private organization other than an agency.” Id. § 551(2). 
210 Id. § 551(1). Section 551(1) exempts certain parties, including Congress, the 
courts, the governments of the U.S. territories and the District of Columbia, court martial 
proceedings or military commissions, and military authority exercised in a theater of war 
or occupied territory. Id. § 551(1)(A)–(G). In addition, the President is not an agency for 
the purposes of the APA. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800–01 (1992). 
211 5 U.S.C. § 551(13). 
212 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 238 n.7 (1980). 
213 See id. 
214 See, e.g., S. Ry. v. Seaboard Allied Milling Corp., 442 U.S. 444, 462 (1979); Dunlop v. 
Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 568 (1975). 
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prudential threshold for standing.215 The court has articulated three 
elements for standing.216 First, the plaintiff must show that she suffered 
injury in fact that is “concrete and particularized.”217 The injury does 
not have to be significant; harm to “recreational or even the mere es-
thetic interests . . . will suffice.”218 The second requirement for standing 
is the existence of a causal connection between the injury and the con-
duct complained of undertaken by the defendant.219 In the regulatory 
and administrative context, the contribution to the harm does not 
need to be significant; a small incremental step is subject to judicial re-
view.220 The final requirement is that judicial decision in favor of the 
plaintiff will redress the injury.221 The plaintiff must personally profit 
from a favorable outcome in the case, otherwise the court would over-
step its assigned role in our constitutional system.222 Redressability may 
include the extent to which an adverse judgment in court deters the 
plaintiff from continuing the unlawful conduct.223 
 A plaintiff that satisfies Article III standing still has to demonstrate 
that it is prudent for the court to resolve her dispute.224 For cases 
brought pursuant to the APA, the Court has articulated a zone of inter-
est test to determine if the party satisfies prudential concerns.225 To sat-
isfy the test, “the plaintiff must establish that the injury [s]he complains 
of . . . falls within the ‘zone of interests’ sought to be protected by the 
statutory provision whose violation forms the legal basis for” her com-
plaint.226 The critical question addressed by the test “is whether Con-
gress ‘intended for [a particular] class [of plaintiffs] to be relied upon 
                                                                                                                      
215 Nat’l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 488 
(1998). 
216 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
217 Id. at 560. 
218 Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1149 (2008) (citing Sierra Club v. 
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734–36 (1972)); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. 
(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 183 (2000) (finding standing for a plaintiff who recreationally 
used a polluted river). 
219 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. The conduct complained of cannot be that of some third 
party who is not a party to the case. Id. Rather, it must be “fairly traceable” to the defen-
dant’s allegedly unlawful conduct. Id. 
220 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 523–24 (2007). 
221 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. 
222 Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39 (1976). 
223 Friends of the Earth, Inc., 528 U.S. at 185–86. 
224 See Robert A. Anthony, Zone-Free Standing for Private Attorneys General, 7 Geo. Mason 
L. Rev. 237, 239 (1999). 
225 Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). 
226 Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990). 
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to challenge agency disregard of the law.’”227 When challenging agency 
action, the particular provision upon which the plaintiff relies in mak-
ing her claim determines whether she falls within the zone of inter-
est.228 The plaintiff’s complaint does not have to fall within the overall 
purpose of the statute, but merely the specific interest or interests Con-
gress sought to protect through the specific statutory provision the 
plaintiff relies on in bringing suit.229 
 When judicial review is sought solely on the grounds provided by 
§ 702, the agency action must be final agency action for which there is 
no other adequate judicial remedy.230 The finality requirement is “con-
cerned with whether the initial decisionmaker has arrived at a defini-
tive position on the issue that inflicts” the injury for which the plaintiff 
is seeking a remedy.231 To be final agency action, the action must be the 
consummation of the agency’s decision-making process.232 The Court 
has held that mere recommendations are not final agency action.233  
2. Treasury Department and Internal Revenue Service Compliance 
with the APA 
 Many scholars have described the IRS’s continued non-compliance 
with the rule-making requirements provided in section 553 of the 
APA.234 Less attention has been given to the question of whether 
agency action taken by the Treasury Department or IRS is subject to 
judicial review as provided by the APA, sections 701 through 706. 
                                                                                                                      
227 Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987) (quoting Block v. Cmty. Nutri-
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2010] Third Party Enforcement of Conservation Easements via the Tax Code 451 
Stephen M. Goodman argues that the Treasury and the IRS are both 
subject to judicial review.235 “Since a revenue ruling is designed to in-
terpret the Internal Revenue Code, it qualifies as an ‘agency action.’”236 
If the IRS’s action is found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of dis-
cretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law, the reviewing 
court is authorized to rule against the agency. Moreover, the Treasury 
Department and the IRS do not possess qualities or responsibilities that 
shield them from judicial review.237 Courts regularly hear cases review-
ing tax determinations by the IRS. While it is true that the Anti-
Injunction Act shields the IRS from suits enjoining the collection of 
revenue, it does not prohibit judicial review when a positive outcome 
for the plaintiff results in the collection of additional revenue.238 
3. The Anti-Injunction Act 
 Two significant obstacles remain to securing judicial review: § 7421 
of the Code, sometimes called the Anti-Injunction Act, and the Declara-
tory Judgment Act (DJA).239 Section 7421 provides that “no suit for the 
purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be 
maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person is 
the person against whom such tax was assessed.”240 The DJA excludes 
from the federal courts’ remedies any declaratory judgments in cases or 
controversies “with respect to Federal taxes” that are not brought pursu-
ant to § 7428 of the Tax Code.241 
 The Court reads § 7421 broadly “to preclude pre-enforcement re-
view of tax cases” that include individual taxpayer claims “with only in-
direct bearing upon the flow of tax revenues . . . regardless of the mer-
its of the issues raised.”242 In a unanimous opinion, the Enoch v. Williams 
Packing & Navigation Co. Court stated that the congressional purpose 
                                                                                                                      
235 Stephen M. Goodman, Note, The Availability and Reviewability of Rulings of the Inter-
nal Revenue Service, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 81, 97 (1964). 
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237 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(1)(A)–(G), 704 (2006). 
238 See infra Part III.B.3. 
239 A Problem of Remedy, supra note 234, at 1164–65. 
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for § 7421 was to “permit the United States to assess and collect taxes 
alleged to be due without judicial intervention, and to require” tax-
payer-initiated suits for refund to determine disputes regarding IRS tax 
assessments.243  
 Congress passed the Anti-Injunction Act in a context where equi-
table principles disfavored injunctions against tax collection, absent 
clear proof that available remedies were inadequate.244 Against this 
background, it is likely that Congress, speaking in broad terms, in-
tended the language “to compel litigants to make use solely of the ave-
nues of review opened by Congress.”245 Though courts recognize that 
the path for redress is suboptimal, courts have emphasized that Con-
gress provided an avenue for judicial review through litigation that 
seeks a refund after the payment of the assessed taxes.246 
 The Court has placed two important limits on § 7421’s scope. Sec-
tion 7421 does not prevent suits by parties for whom Congress has not 
provided an avenue for judicial review.247 “Congress did not intend the 
Act to apply to actions brought by aggrieved parties for whom it has not 
provided an alternative remedy.”248 The Court has also limited § 7421’s 
scope to actions that frustrate the collection of revenues.249 The Anti-
Injunction Act does not apply to cases where the plaintiff is seeking an 
injunction that would require the IRS to assess and collect taxes from a 
third party.250 The Abortion Rights Mobilization Court acknowledged that 
third party suits may be a strain on IRS resources, but found that the 
theme in the cases is that § 7421 “only extends to those actions it ex-
pressly refers to” that would restrain the collection of tax revenues.251 
IV. Increased Public Accountability for the Enforcement of 
Conservation Easements via the Tax Code 
 This Note proposes a collateral method of enforcement that does 
not seek to enforce the terms of a conservation easement, but focuses 
on whether they entitle the easement donor to the income tax deduc-
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tions provided by § 170 of the Code.252 An aggrieved party would file 
the envisioned cause of action against the IRS Commissioner for im-
properly allowing the deduction for an easement that fails to satisfy 
§ 170(h)’s requirements.253 The suit would allege that the Commis-
sioner improperly authorized the deduction for the easement instead 
of finding a deficiency in the taxpayer’s return.254 The relief sought by 
the lawsuit would be an order requiring the Commissioner to initiate 
deficiency proceedings against the easement donor.255 
A. Chosing a Course (or Cause) of Action: Assessing Alternative Arguments for 
Third Party Standing to Enforce Conservation Easements 
 While direct suits may be preferable in some situations, the reach 
of a suit against the Commissioner is distinct from the traditional 
modes of enforcement.256 Enforcement proceedings that seek to com-
pel the owner to comply with the easement terms assume that the 
easements are beneficial;257 however, not all conservation easements 
actually provide a public benefit.258 If the goal is conserving land, suing 
to enforce the terms of an easement that provides little to no public 
benefit would not protect conservation values.259 The envisioned law-
suit presumes that the terms of the easement, by failing to satisfy 
§ 170(h)’s requirements, do not provide to the general public the 
benefit that justifies the foregone tax revenue.260 
 The proposed cause of action presumes that the plaintiff will be 
engaged in the community.261 Like the organization discussed in Reve-
nue Ruling 76-204, the plaintiff will need to have a cooperative rela-
tionship with the other local conservationists and government officials 
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to keep abreast of what is happening in the community.262 A plaintiff 
may encounter difficulty in securing specific information even though 
the terms of the easement are supposed to be recorded in the situs 
state’s recordation system.263 State recording practices vary from state 
to state and are notoriously unreliable.264 The plaintiff will likely have 
to use discovery to ascertain the value of the easement and the deduc-
tion taken on the taxpayer’s tax return.265 
B. Getting into Court: Pleadings and Establishing Standing 
1. The Commissioner’s Unlawful Conduct 
 Seeking judicial review pursuant to APA §§ 702 and 704,266 the 
complaint would allege that the Commissioner failed to execute his 
duties under §§ 6201, 6212, and 6213 of the Code.267 Under § 6201 of 
the Internal Revenue Code, the Commissioner is required to “make the 
inquiries, determinations, and assessments of all taxes . . . imposed by” 
the Code.268 In the case of a donation of a conservation easement that 
does not satisfy § 170(h)’s requirements, the Commissioner has the 
duty to initiate deficiency proceedings against the taxpayer.269 In Bennett 
v. Spear, the Commissioner’s failure to do so allowed the taxpayer to 
take actions inconsistent with the donation’s supposed conservation 
purposes that undermined the plaintiff’s interest in the preservation of 
the burdened parcel.270 The suit would seek an order compelling the 
Commissioner to file a notice of deficiency that initiates deficiency pro-
ceedings against the taxpayer.271 
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2. Standing 
 While standing ensures the constitutional and prudential exercise 
of the court’s judicial function instead of the merits of the plaintiff’s 
claim,272 it can nevertheless serve as a proxy for the determination of 
the merits.273 This is particularly true for cases brought under the 
APA.274 If the court wants to get to the merits of the case, it will find 
that the plaintiff has standing; if it does not, it will find that the plaintiff 
lacks standing.275 While establishing standing will be difficult for a 
plaintiff challenging the Commissioner’s approval of income tax de-
ductions for a conservation easement, it is not impossible.276 
a. Injury in Fact 
 Even though the Supreme Court has narrowed standing in envi-
ronmental actions,277 it is still available for environmental suits where 
the plaintiffs are personally harmed by a defendant’s conduct.278 The 
complaint must show a legally cognizable harm suffered by the plaintiff 
or the plaintiff’s members if the plaintiff is an organization.279 While the 
general public benefit associated with conservation easements is likely 
too broad a foundation to support standing absent concrete injury,280 a 
plaintiff that has a recreational or an aesthetic interest in the burdened 
parcel can show a concrete, personal injury sufficient to confer stand-
ing.281 For instance, if the plaintiff drives along a highway with a scenic 
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viewshed of which the burdened parcel is a part, any development that 
compromises the aesthetic quality of the view is sufficient to confer 
standing.282 The plaintiff would have to submit affidavits showing the 
nature of the concrete, specific injury that resulted from the Commis-
sioner’s failure to properly police conservation contributions.283 
b. Causation 
 Causation in the standing inquiry is analogous to proximate causa-
tion in tort law.284 The plaintiff must show a “fairly traceable causal 
connection between the claimed injury and the challenged con-
duct.”285 The tax incentives and subsequent failure of the IRS to prop-
erly police the deductions must contribute to the plaintiff’s injury.286 
The court is inconsistent in its holdings on how direct the connection 
must be in order to confer standing on the plaintiffs.287 United State v. 
SCRAP is viewed by many as the zenith in environmental standing 
where the causal chain between the defendant’s actions and the plain-
tiffs’ injuries was particularly attenuated.288 However, after Warth and 
Eastern Kentucky “[o]nly an optimist will assume . . . that injuries as indi-
rect in nature as those recognized by the court in SCRAP” will be suffi-
cient to confer standing on the plaintiff.289 
 Admittedly, the plaintiff in the envisioned suit should anticipate 
difficulty in satisfying the causation requirement.290 Causation is par-
ticularly difficult to establish when the injury involves the actions of a 
third party that are not before the court.291 However, it may not be im-
possible, provided the plaintiff’s pleadings develop a factual scenario 
that shows a bona fide question of fact that the Commissioner’s failure 
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to initiate deficiency proceedings lead to the plaintiff’s injury.292 Addi-
tionally the plaintiff should allege that weak enforcement leads to the 
donation of easements with terms that do not adequately promote the 
conservation values underlying the tax deductions.293 
 The plaintiff does not have to demonstrate that she will win on the 
merits in order to establish standing.294 It is a threshold determination, 
and she simply has to make an initial showing that she suffered injury 
as a consequence of the Commissioner’s failure to enforce § 170(h)’s 
requirements.295 Returning to the example of the highway viewshed, 
the plaintiff would have to show that the development along the high-
way happened because the Commissioner failed to make a deficiency 
determination, and that the development would not have happened if 
the Commissioner had initiated deficiency proceedings against the tax-
payer who donated the easement. 
c. Redressability 
 The relief sought would be an order compelling the Commissioner 
to serve on the taxpayer a notice of deficiency and subsequent tax as-
sessment.296 Like causation, redressability may prove difficult for the en-
visioned suit.297 The plaintiff will have to show that the deficiency pro-
ceeding will actually restore or otherwise provide relief for the injury 
suffered due to the inadequacy of the challenged conservation ease-
ment.298 The envisioned remedy would do little to provide relief where 
the easement burdens a parcel with little or no conservation value even 
though such easements exist.299 
 However, the court order could lead to amended easement 
terms.300 Absent an easement holder that will easily relinquish the ease-
ment, the owner of the burdened parcel usually cannot make the uni-
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lateral decision to undo the restriction on her land.301 After the initia-
tion of deficiency proceedings, the taxpayer may petition the Tax Court 
to allow amendments to the easement terms in order to bring them into 
compliance with the Code, thereby recouping a portion of the prop-
erty’s lost development value.302 The court order can also lead to the 
cessation of development activities on the burdened parcel.303 If devel-
opment is underway the easement may be modified to relocate or scale-
back the development to reduce its impact.304 
 The suit may also deter other taxpayers from taking deductions for 
conservation contributions that fail to satisfy § 170(h)’s requirements.305 
The court has held that deterrence from ongoing or future unlawful 
conduct that injures the plaintiff is an adequate remedy.306 Studies have 
shown that taxpayers who suspect or anticipate that the IRS will detect 
any violations—or that their violations will be reported to the IRS by 
third parties—are more likely to comply with the Code; suits seeking 
deficiency proceedings may have the same effect in ensuring tax com-
pliance.307 The envisioned suit can act to bring to the IRS’s attention 
conservation easements that fail to satisfy 170(h)’s requirements, in-
creasing the probability of detection of those easements that fail to sat-
isfy § 170(h)’s requirements as well as increased compliance with the 
same.308 
d. The Anti-Injunction Act 
 Plaintiffs bringing suit to challenge the deductions can anticipate 
the argument that the relief sought is prohibited by the Anti-Injunction 
Act.309 As demonstrated above, such an argument misconstrues the 
                                                                                                                      
301 See id. at 190–97 (discussing easement termination and release). 
302 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 170(b), 6212, 6213 (2006); Strasburg v. Comm’r, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 
1697, 1704–05 (2000). Amending the easement terms may lead to tax penalties for the 
donor and donee, depending on the change in the value of the easement. See Byers & 
Ponte, supra note 25, at 188–89. 
303 See Byers & Ponte, supra note 25, at 158–59. 
304 See id. 
305 See Sagit Leviner, A New Era of Tax Enforcement: From “Big Stick” to Responsive Regula-
tion, 42 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 381, 400–01 (2009) (discussing how the possibility of report-
ing by third parties increases compliance). 
306 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185–86 
(2000). 
307 See Leviner, supra note 305, at 400–01. 
308 See id. 
309 26 U.S.C. § 7421 (2006); see supra notes 239–51 and accompanying text. 
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Act’s scope and applicability.310 First of all, there is no other judicial 
remedy available to the plaintiffs to challenge the donor’s tax liabili-
ties.311 The petition to the Tax Court for a refund, which is the route 
provided by Congress, is unavailable for challenging the Commis-
sioner’s failure to serve a deficiency notice.312 Furthermore, the envi-
sioned suit does involve pre-collection judicial interference that would 
impinge or otherwise frustrate the orderly collection of revenue, 
§ 7421’s primary concern.313 Rather, it increases the flow of revenue 
into the Treasury and therefore falls outside the scope of § 7421.314 
C. Prudential Concerns 
 Because the suit is brought pursuant to the APA, the plaintiff will 
have to show that the action challenged was final agency action.315 
There is little doubt that the assessment officer’s recordation of the 
taxpayer’s liabilities constitutes final agency action because the IRS has 
reached a “definitive position” regarding the particular taxpayer’s re-
turn.316 Furthermore, the plaintiff does not have the option of pursu-
ing other procedural or judicial remedies; therefore, the assessment 
officer’s processing of the taxpayer’s return is action that is subject to 
judicial review under the APA.317 
 She will also have to show that she is within the zone of interest 
protected by the statute.318 The zone of interest test will frequently in-
volve a citizen-suit provision;319 however, it has emerged as a “pruden-
tial standing requirement[] of general application.”320 The zone of in-
terest test is a “guide for deciding whether” Congress intended that “a 
particular plaintiff should be heard to complain of a particular agency 
decision.”321 To satisfy the test, which is not particularly difficult, the 
plaintiff will have to show that her interests are more than “marginally 
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related” to and consistent with § 170(h)’s purpose.322 Because the zone 
of interest test is not identical with injury-in-fact, the plaintiff could ap-
peal to the significant public benefit provided by conservation ease-
ments.323 Drawing on the language in Bennett v. Spear, the plaintiff 
could argue that she falls within the zone of interest protected by con-
servation easements because she is a member of the general public, to 
whom the easements’ benefits run.324 She does not have to appeal to 
the legislative purpose behind the various tax reform measures, but can 
rely specifically on the purpose behind the legislation authorizing de-
ductions for conservation contributions.325 The legislative history,326 
the conservation purposes test under the Code,327 and the regula-
tions328 indicate that the tax incentives provide a measure of environ-
mental protection against development and the loss of open spaces.329 
Congress intended tax incentives to attract and facilitate the donation 
of easements with significant benefits that accrue to the general pub-
lic.330 Just as citizen-suit provisions anticipate a lack of political will and 
resources to enforce environmental laws,331 a suit against the Commis-
sioner can provide additional policing of conservation easements to 
ensure that the deductions are justified by the benefit to the public and 
the environment.332 
Conclusion 
 Conservation easements have grown in popularity as a conse-
quence of the generous tax deductions available to easement donors. 
Since the 1980s, the number of land trust and similar organizations has 
grown in response to an increased awareness of the value of open 
space, particularly on the urban fringe. Conservation easements have 
been an effective tool, preserving millions of acres; however, they have 
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also been a tool for tax shelters and other tax abuses. The IRS does not 
have the resources to audit every taxpayer who takes a deduction for a 
conservation easement. A suit that challenges the deduction may pro-
vide a collateral method for enforcing conservation easements, ensur-
ing that the easements for which deductions are taken actually yield a 
substantial public benefit. 
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